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THE PLACE OF THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE
TEACHING OF PROCEDURE
DELMAR KARLEN*

If there is any proposition upon which teachers of procedure seem
to agree it is that the Federal Rules ought to be a focal point of
interest in the study of their subject. Most casebooks on general
procedure published in recent years emphasize their concentration
upon the Federal Rules: Vanderbilt's Cases on Modern Procedureand
Judicial Administration, Field and Kaplan's Materials on Civil Procedure, Brown, Vestal and Ladd's Cases and Materials on Pleading
and Procedure, to mention only a few. And when older casebooks,
like Scott and Simpson's Cases and Other Materials on Civil Procedure or Clark's Cases on Modern Pleading are revised, the revision
almost invariably is in the direction of greater attention to the Federal
Rules. The remarkable thing about these books is that not one of
them is designed as a vehicle for the teaching of federal procedure
as such. Every one is offered as a vehicle for the teaching of procedure generally.
Is this tendency just a fad? Or merely a device to boost sales by
offering a product which can be described as national in scope? Or
is it a sound development? Some men would answer without hesitation that the development is to be applauded. For example, Professor
James William Moore, writing a review in 1950 on a casebook in the
special field of federal practice, said:
"The authors have, quite naturally, given us a casebook for a specialized
course designed to supplement supposedly basic procedural courses. The
tables should be turned. Federal jurisdiction and practice should be the
basic procedural course in the law schools. Other procedural courses, if
necessary at all to nod provincially at such states as Connecticut, New
York, Pennsylvania and Texas, would be fillers. Such suggestions, however, have an appalling effect upon curriculum committees. For there
is nothing like membership on a curriculum committee to make a black
reactionary out of an otherwise normal and forward looking person. The
sadism of Lord Coke and his forms of action, the cant of the equity
pleader, the hodge-podge of code pleading, and the reverence for by-gone
procedures cast a spell. And from the spell, curriculum committees
emerge with today's masquerades that are known as the basic procedural
courses." 1
Whether Professor Moore's point of view is a sound one depends, I
believe, upon the place that the Federal Rules occupy in the entire
field of procedure.
* Professor of Law, New York University.
1. Moore, Book Review, 59 YALE L.J. 1557, 1558-59 (1950).
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First, let us look at the obvious limitation that the Rules apply of
their own force only to cases in the federal courts. A relatively small
proportion of the litigation of the nation is carried on in those courts.
Most practitioners spend a good deal more of their time in the state
courts than in the federal courts. While every lawyer ought to know
his way around in the federal courts, he must know his way around
in the courts of his own state. If, therefore, a choice has to be made
in law school between state practice and federal practice, prima
facie it ought to be made in favor of state practice.
But, the makers of casebooks might reply, the Federal Rules have
been extensively copied. Nine states have adopted them almost in
toto, and many other states have copied particular provisions. All
this is true, and seems to be an excellent reason for concentrating
on the Federal Rules in law schools located in states which have
adopted the Federal Rules wholly or in large part. The trouble with
the argument, however, is that substantially the same thing might
be said of the Field Code which went into effect in 1848 in New
York, and which, as of the present moment, has been far more
extensively copied than the Federal Rules. It would be no great feat
to demonstrate statistically that a much greater number of cases
today are being conducted along the pattern of procedure established
by the Field Code than along the pattern established by the Federal
Rules.
But the Federal Rules are the rules of the future, say their enthusiasts. No one would dream of copying the Field Code now, whereas
every year the Federal Rules gain new ground. They are rational,
simple, clear-altogether the best set of rules now available, and
the one likely to prevail generally in the future. Maybe so. Maybe
New York and other states laboring under the Field Code or some
modification of it will some day adopt the Federal Rules. But when?
A generation hence? Two generations? And in the meantime, what
shall the students study who intend to practice in such states? Shall
they eschew learning about demurrers, causes of action, bills of
particulars and similar "antiquities" on the ground that those devices
and concepts may some day be abandoned?
Enough has been said to indicate that whatever justification there
is for concentration upon the Federal Rules in the teaching of
procedure does not lie in the practical present day importance of
those rules.
Another difficulty with concentrating on the Federal Rules is that
they are very limited in scope even with respect to procedure in the
federal courts. No one, by studying them alone, could learn enough
of the basic concepts of procedure to be able to handle the simplest
sort of case. A man might know the Rules by heart and understand
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perfectly every case interpreting and applying them, but still know

precious little about procedure. The reason is, of course, that the
Rules do not purport to be anything like a complete code. They leave
untouched vast and important areas of procedure. For example,
jurisdiction and venue are not covered or affected by the Federal
Rules.2 Yet an understanding of these matters is a prerequisite to
even getting into court. Similarly, the remedies available in judicial
proceedings, a knowledge of which is fundamental to any lawyer,
are not covered in the Rules. The same is true of the nature, scope
and availability of appellate review. Again the knowledge is essential
and again it cannot be acquired from the Rules. Even the application
of the Rules, involving as it does the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins
with its manifold complications, 3 is not spelled out in the Rules
themselves.
There were adequate reasons for the draftsmen of the Rules not
to cover such matters (because, of course, the rule-making authority
of the Supreme Court was limited), but the fact that they are left
out means that knowledge as to them has to come from other
sources. Even on topics within the scope of the Rules, the treatment
is sometimes sketchy in the extreme. For example, Rules 38 and
39 deal with trial by jury, but they cover only the mechanics of
demand and waiver. The far more important, interesting and basic
problem of the right to trial by jury is left untouched. That has to be
learned by studying the applicable constitutional provisions in the
light of the history of law and equity and their merger. Similarly,
Rule 50 deals with the motion for a directed verdict, but provides
no light on the crucial question of when such a motion should be
granted. Only mechanics are covered. Rule 59 deals with the mechanics of the motion for a new trial, but where is one to learn the
grounds for such a motion, or the scope of the trial court's discretion
in reaching a decision?

In some cases, the Federal Rules make explicit reference to state
practice. Thus on such crucial matters as the execution of judgments
or the use of provisional remedies, the only source of knowledge even
in connection with federal cases lies in state practice.
This is not a complete catalogue of omissions. Any practitioner or
procedure teacher can expand it with many examples of other
procedural concepts not touched upon or not developed in the Rules.
The truth of the matter is that the Federal Rules are nothing more
than a fragmentary gloss on the law of procedure. The fundamental
presuppositions of the subject-the nature of the judicial process, the
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 82.

3. See Clark, State Law in the FederalCourts: The Brooding Omnipresence
of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946); Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey and
Day, Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494 (1949).
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adversary system, the substitution of rational methods of inquiry in

place of force or supernatural guidance-are not to be discovered by
any amount of concentration upon the Federal Rules. And, as indicated

above, even a coherent and reasonably comprehensive picture of the
main surface rules for conducting litigation does not emerge from
the Rules. Excessive preoccupation with them can serve only to
distort the picture.
What then is the proper place of the Federal Rules in the teaching
of procedure? Are they to be disregarded? Certainly not. Not only
do they have a very substantial value in understanding the operations
of the federal courts and other courts functioning under substantially
similar rules, but they also have great general educational value.
They represent some of the best and most influential thinking about
procedure in our time. They provide better solutions to a large number
of problems than can be found in the Field Code or others patterned
after it. They are, for the most part, simple, clear and sensible.
But it must not be thought that the Federal Rules provide the
final solution for the problems with which they deal any more than
that they tell the whole story. Some of the Rules are unduly complicated and burdensome, like Rule 50b. 4 Others are unnecessarily vague
and confused, like Rule 60. 5 Others are of highly debatable intrinsic
merit, like Rule 8.6 No one should become complacent about any
aspect of procedure in the foolish belief that the best possible solution to even a single problem has been found and embalmed in the
Federal Rules. The millennium has not been reached, but only a
marker on the way.
All this is but a roundabout way of saying that the Federal Rules
should be kept in perspective. An easy and proper way to do this
is to use them comparatively, along with parallel state rules. Thus
similarities and differences can be noted, explored and appraised.
After all, federal practice is not a thing apart, divorced and unrelated
to state practice. It is not even sufficiently different to warrant a
separate course in law school. Nor, for the reasons expounded at
length above, is it sufficiently important to pre-empt the field. It can
and should be studied alongside of state practice, and in the light of
the rich history of the entire subject of procedure. The important
thing, as in all law study, is to discover the basic problems, not to
4. Especially as interpreted in Johnson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344
U.S. 48, 73 Sup. Ct. 125, 97 L. Ed. 77 (1952), 6 VANM. L. REV. 791 (1953).
See Peterfreund, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice, 1952 ANNUAL Sunwvn or
AMERcAN LAW 681, 692.
5. See Moore and Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 55 YALE
L.J. 623 (1946).
6. See, e.g., McMahon, The Case Against Fact Pleadingin Louisiana, 13 LA.
L. REv. 369 (1953); Tucker, Proposal for Retention of the Louisiana System
of Fact Pleading;Epose des Motifs, 13 LA. L. REv. 395 (1953).
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brood upon a particular, limited and temporary solution to a few of
them.
The Federal Rules are but one tool for the teaching of procedure.
They are not the entire workshop.

